Presented article contributes to the extensive discussion over the mutual relationship between serious human rights violations (violation of ius cogens) and the law of state immunity. Th e structure of article derives from the argumentation presented by Germany and Italy in current dispute before the International Court of Justice. Author focuses his attention on delimitation of existing international legal framework and particularly on assessment of friction areas in German and Italian submissions. Th ree separate issues are analyzed: temporal, territorial and material.
Introduction

At the end of 2008 Germany initiated proceedings against Italy before the International Court of Justice (hereaft er ICJ) alleging that "Italian judicial bodies have repeatedly disregarded the jurisdictional immunity of Germany as a sovereign State."
1 Th e matter of the dispute rests in the judgment in Ferrini case of the Italian Corte di Cassazione rendered on 11 March 2004. Italian Supreme Court was seized by civil claim brought against Germany by plaintiff who was deported in 1944 by German troops from Italy to German Reich where he was forced to work for war industry. Ferrini petitioned Germany for physical and psychological harm due to the inhuman treatment he was subjected to during his imprisonment.
2 While lower instances dismissed the case arguing by lack of jurisdiction, Italian Supreme Court completely overturned these opinions and ruled in favor of appellant. Ferrini decision opened notional Pandora's box and stimulated already hot discussion over the mutual relationship between serious violations of human rights and the law of state immunity. Obvious question, which is in the centre of presented article, is whether the law of state immunity is perforated by a newly established exception, i.e. by serious violation of human rights which form part of ius cogens? Th is issue has always been popular among scholars, but thanks to ongoing proceedings before the ICJ it currently gains the highest possible recency.
Presented article is divided into three parts. In the brief fi rst part, the emphasis is put on the notion of state immunity as such, with particular focus on the evolution of state immunity, which is signifi cantly marked with its continuous limitation. Second part describes current legal framework (treaties, relevant case-law) in specifi c area of state immunity which is of primary importance for this article, namely in the area of state immunity for serious violations of human rights. Th ird part analyzes potential arguments in favor of change of existing law, it explores whether in cases of human rights violation it is already valid to make state immunity inapplicable. Primary source of reference is the argumentation presented by German and Italian governments in the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State Case (hereaft er Immunity Case), both in its written and oral part. Th e third part also tries to predict fi nal judgment of the ICJ which, if rendered, would be of the highest importance for international law in this area as it is for the very fi rst time when the ICJ is engaged in such kind of dispute.
Th e Notion of State Immunity and Its Historical Evolution
State immunity protects a state and its property from the jurisdiction of the courts of another state. State immunity "is a plea relating to the adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction of national courts which bars the municipal court of one State from adjudicating the disputes of another State." 3 It is product and direct consequence of unique character of public international law which provides for sovereign equality of states: par in parem non habet imperium. 4 State immunity evolved in connection with the development of the concept of sovereignty and the territorial state, it is fundamental principle of the international legal order. State immunity is still based on customary international law as its codifi cation eff ected by the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Th eir Property (hereaft er UN Convention) adopted in 2004 has not yet entered into force. 
State Immunity for Serious Human Rights Violation -Legal Framework
Aft er short introduction of subject-matter, it is necessary to specify legal framework (treaties, international case-law, relevant domestic case-law used as evidence of state practice) in specifi c area of state immunity, i.e. in the area of state immunity for serious human rights violations.
Currently, there is no international treaty which would address this particular issue, callings for conventional regulation remain to be limited on doctrinal sphere.
12 Th ere are no hard exceptions regarding non-immunity for serious human rights violations, but certain indicias worth to be mentioned.
13 Of importance are Art 11 of the European Convention on State Immunity (hereaft er European Convention) and similar provision of Art 12 of the UN Convention. Th ese articles provide for so-called tort exception to state immunity, which is nevertheless limited to the territory of the forum state. If tort (wrongful act) is committed abroad, i.e. not on the territory of the state whose courts are seized in the matter, these provisions are inapplicable. Unfortunately, such scenario would be rather rule than exception. As far as potential existence of a customary rule is concerned, it shall be further discussed in the following section.
Due to the lack of primary sources, one must take into account existing judicial practice as subsidiary mean for the determination of rules of law. Th e European Court of Human Rights (hereaft er ECHR) dealt with the matter in at least four decisions which are therefore seminal for every discussion over the topic. 2001 . He had been taken away by secret police directly from hospital and then tortured and mistreated for no less than 67 days. In Naït-Liman v. Switzerland Tunisian national, while living in Italy, was arrested and abducted to Tunis. Over a period of 40 days he was arbitrarily detained and subjected to torture. He later fl ed to Switzerland where he was granted refugee status. National courts in both cases refused to award claimed damages with argument they did not have jurisdiction as alleged acts were committed abroad and they must have respected state immunity of Saudi Arabia and Tunisia.
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Relevant practice of domestic courts is far more extensive and cannot be enumerated at full length. Germany puts forward cases from Poland, Serbia, Belgium, Slovenia, France (Bucheron v. Germany), the United Kingdom (Jones v. Saudi Arabia), the United States (Princz v. Germany), Canada (Bouzari v. Iran) and Greece, understandably all supportive of its own position. Especially Greek case-law is of the utmost importance for Immunity Case. In Voiotia v. Germany Greek Supreme Court for the fi rst time addressed massacre in Distomo village. With reliance on the tort exception, as described above, it applied restrictive doctrine of state immunity and decided in favor of petitioners. 
Friction Areas in Parties' Submissions -What Solution for German-Italian Dispute?
In the last and central part of presented paper the focus is given on particular friction areas in German and Italian submissions presented both in written and oral part of the proceedings in Immunity Case before the ICJ. By friction areas fundamental disagreement over specifi c legal issues is meant. Among these issues attention shall be given to following questions: (a) whether state immunities are of substantive or procedural character; (b) whether locus delicti commissi has relevance for granting or withholding of immunities; (c) whether ius cogens norms can prevail over dispositive rules of state immunity? Th e fi rst question refl ects temporal application of state immunity, the second deals with territorial application. Last issue refers to hierarchy of norms in current public international law.
a) Character of State Immunity and Aspect of Inter-Temporal Law
German and Italian submissions diff er signifi cantly from the very starting point. Germany describes state immunities as substantive rules which derive from the sovereign equality of states (Art 2 (1) of the UN Charter) and which have "little, if anything to do with procedure." 21 Contrary to German arguments, Italy describes immunity as a procedural rule which aff ects the jurisdictional competence of a court, i.e. which acts as a procedural bar once judicial proceedings is initiated.
22 Proper classifi cation of state immunity nature is not only of academic relevance, as it has signifi cant impact on applicable law. If state immunity is defi ned as substantive rule, it is widely accepted that it must be assessed according to the law in force at the time when relevant juridical facts occurred -in framework of Immunity Case this should be law in force between 1943 and 1945. On the other hand, if state immunity is defi ned as procedural rule, it should be assessed on the basis of the law in force at the time when the court is rules of international law. seized. Th e latter variant opens door for evaluation of development which public international law has undergone from the end of WW 2 till 2008, when current dispute was initiated.
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Character of state immunity has been described in procedural terms in caselaw of international and national tribunals. It determines the forum before which the case is held and, at the same time, does not aff ect underlying substantive right or duty of petitioner or defendant. State immunity is a procedural rule going to the jurisdiction of a national court. It does not go to substantive law; it does not contradict a prohibition contained in a jus cogens norm but merely diverts any breach of it to a diff erent method of settlement. Arguably, then, there is no substantive content in the procedural plea of State immunity upon which a jus cogens mandate can bite. when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled." 29 Th is principle acts as guarantor of stability and legal certainty of law and as such is of the utmost importance in any legal system. Huber's statement has been widely accepted to this very day despite its frequent misinterpretation, especially with connection to the second element of his dictum.
30 Generally speaking, judicial facts must be assessed according to the law in force at the time when the facts occurred. Th ere is no law without exceptions however, and it holds true for inter-temporal rule as well. First exception is adherent to human rights treaties which are to be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions. Most known examples of this progressive interpretation emanate from the practice of the ECHR.
31 In cases dealing with state immunity and serious violation of human rights, the ECHR has not yet accepted that Art 6, guaranteeing right to fair trial, of the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which is always invoked by petitioners, should be interpreted in such a manner, as to allow penetration of state immunity. Quite contrary, with reference to margin of appreciation doctrine, the ECHR stresses the lack of state practice in area, or more precisely, its heterogeneity -it is therefore up to states to make up relevant and constant precedents which could be approved subsequently by international judicial bodies.
32 Arguably this creates egregious vicious circle.
Second exception points to the area of procedural rules. Th ere is stable practice that any courts (both national and international) should apply procedural rules which are in force at the time when the courts are seized. If state immunity is considered as procedural rule, one can make conclusion that inter-temporal principle is not applied.
33 As far as dispute between Germany and Italy is concerned, relevant time framework would be year 1998, when Corte di Cassazione declared that Italy held jurisdiction with regard to claim in Ferrini case, and year 2008 when dispute was presented before the ICJ. Such outcome is to the certain extent undesirable (as there is ten years gap which can be of some importance, i.e. the ICJ should take into account potential development of law within these ten years), but if state immunity is considered thoroughly as the institute of procedural law, it is at the same time the only possible solution and interpretation. Immunity Case before the ICJ is moreover somehow specifi c, as it refers to the events which occurred during WW 2 -the problem of inter-temporal law would not be topical if wrongful act is committed in recent years. Anyway, it must be assessed whether current international law allows for newly created exception in the law of state immunity, namely penetration of state immunity in situation of serious violations of human rights. Before this crucial issue is answered relevance of loci delicti commissi shall be considered.
b) Territorial Aspect in the Law of State Immunity
Question which is to be addressed in the following section is whether the venue, where wrongful acts take place, has infl uence on granting or withholding of state immunities. To give example, one may ask whether legal assessment would be diff erent if off ence is done abroad or on the territory of a forum state. 34 Th is issue is important even in the Immunity Case, as the wrongful act committed by Germany took place at least partly in Italy.
35 Th e most important rule dealing with territorial aspects of state immunity is Art 12 of the UN Convention. Although this convention is not yet in force, it is the most relevant source of the law of state immunity and therefore has to be taken into account.
Th is article (i.e. Art 12 of the UN Convention) is listed among exceptions to state immunity. It says that state A cannot invoke immunity from jurisdiction before a court of state B which is otherwise competent in a proceeding which relates to pecuniary compensation for death or injury to the person, or damage to or loss of tangible property, caused by an act or omission which is alleged to be attributable to the state A, if the act or omission occurred in whole or in part in the territory of state B and if the author of the act or omission was present in that territory at the time of the act or omission. Th is rule is rather complex, but at the fi rst sight it is clear that immunity can only be invoked in situations where wrongful act was committed on the territory of the forum state. Th e rationale behind this rule is simple -the most convenient court is that of the state where the delict was committed. Th ere is no similar rule which would make state immunity inapplicable when such conduct occurred outside the territory of the forum state. According to Fox, " [ 39 Th e rule has dispositive character, it is used unless otherwise agreed between the states concerned, plus, the existence of two cumulative conditions has to be fulfi lled for application of this exception. First, the act must be committed at least partly in the territory of the forum state and second, the author of such act or omission must also be present in that state at the time of the act or omission. Such solution was criticized, because it excludes some transboundary damages (fi ring or shooting across the border), e.g. those resulting from an armed confl ict. 40 Next, there is no need to distinguish between acta iure imperii and acta iure gestionis, as the exception covers all types of acts irrespective of their character. Finally, as one commentator stressed, Art 12 of the UN Convention "is helpful only in a very small number of cases" 41 -more typical would be Al-Adsani like scenario where petitioner suff ers damage abroad and is unable to obtain redress directly in the forum state.
Th e most diffi cult issue connected with interpretation of Art 12 of the UN Convention is whether it covers claims arising from the armed confl ict. 42 It was argued that claims for damages resulting from transboundary eff ects of armed confl icts would be rejected without else, the answer is not so much clear with regard to armed confl icts occurring directly in the territory of the forum state. Th e UN Convention, contrary to its European regional counterpart, contains no express rule excluding its applicability to armed forces. Th e European Convention provides for such rule in Art 31 according to which "nothing in the present Convention 45 Th e same is true for Margellos case heard before Greek Special Supreme Court, which departed from previous Distomo case. Greek court came to conclusion that at the present stage of development of international law, a generally accepted rule of international law that allows an action to be brought against one state before the courts of another state for compensation arising from any type of tort that took place in the territory of the forum, and in which the armed forces of the defendant state were involved in any way, either in peace or in time of war, has not yet emerged.
46 Lastly, rules excluding armed activities from framework of domestic legislation (e.g. State Immunity Act of the UK) can be traced in most common law countries.
Exhaustive investigation of the subject was conducted by A. Dickinson, who concludes that question of applicability of the UN Convention towards activities of armed forces is far from being answered.
47 Th ere are categories of privileges and immunities which are not aff ected by the convention (Art 3), the absence of any specifi c mention about immunities of armed forces tends (a contrario) to the conclusion that the UN Convention is simply applicable to armed activities. General regulation can be nevertheless replaced by specifi c agreements (e.g. status of force agreements) whose existence and availability are anticipated in 
c) Hierarchy of Norms in International Law -Ius Cogens and State Immunity
It was already mentioned that Italian submission is based on simple assumptions: serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by German troops in Italy during WW 2 can be described as violations of ius cogens (a), as state immunity has only dispositive character (b), there is no doubt that a contradiction between two binding legal norms ought to be resolved by giving precedence to the norm with the higher status. 49 At the very outset it needs to be stressed that mutual relation between ius cogens and state immunity concerns a linkage between peremptory and dispositive rules. Th e law of state immunity has in no way obtained status of imperative norms therefore there is no confl ict of peremptory norms at stake.
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Th e opinion of scholars in this question is, without any surprise, divided. Th ere are opinions arguing in favor of primacy of ius cogens over rules of state immunity and opinions which argue against 51 -tertium non datur. Proponents usually argue by hierarchy of norms, opponents point out to the lack of practice in area, or refer to diff erent character of peremptory norms and rules of state immunity. According to the latter plea, there is no space for contact between ius cogens and state immunity, because fi rst rules have substantive content whilst second only procedural one. Accordingly, "state immunity only concerns the enforcement, not the material content of the jus cogens rule." 52 It seems that such opinion is of no use in Immunity Case, as Germany from the very beginning contends that state immunity is of material character and Italy adopts position according to which ius cogens have eff ects even in area of procedural law. It is worth to describe relevant arguments at some length.
According to Italy, there are at least three reasons which can be submitted to give support for its position. First one rests in analogy with development in international criminal law. Perpetrators of crimes under international law cannot further shield behind the cloak of their function. At the latest from 1945, there is constant rule in international law according to which the offi cial position of defendants, whether heads of state or responsible offi cials in government departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment. 53 Neither personal nor functional immunities are relevant in pro-ceedings before international tribunals. As far as proceedings before domestic courts are concerned, only personal immunities are applicable, but once a person ceases to hold the offi ce, he or she will no longer enjoy any such protection -functional immunities are not relevant for crimes under international law. 54 To put it diff erently, as Italy suggests, it is untenable to maintain that while ius cogens have procedural eff ects in criminal proceedings, it cannot cause similar consequences in civil proceedings where state responsibility is concerned. To use another analogy, this situation somehow brings back discussion over criminalization of violation of international humanitarian law in non-international armed confl icts. It took some time before the ICTY famously ruled out that " [w] hat is inhumane, and consequently proscribed, in international wars, cannot but be inhumane and inadmissible in civil strife."
55 Tadić decision marked important step toward overcoming of that time prevailing doctrine of divided humanity which distinguished between diff erent kinds of confl icts.
Second argument speaks about tacit waiver of immunity in situations of serious violations of human rights. Th is theory asserts that violation of ius cogens cannot be considered as sovereign act, and therefore, "[w]hen a State act is no longer recognized as sovereign, the State is no longer entitled to invoke the defense of sovereign immunity."
56 In the opinion of present author this line of reasoning however lacks persuasiveness. It seems that such reading of waiver goes too far behind what would be acceptable for states, as waiver deals with expression of will, which would be simply missing in described situations. It is acceptable that waiver can be implied (e.g. state voluntarily takes part in initiated proceedings), but anyway states must still express somehow its readiness or willingness to confer jurisdiction to a court of another state. Mere fact that subject matter of the dispute deals with violation of ius cogens does not automatically generates jurisdiction of any court. Such conclusion has its resonance even in case-law of the ICJ.
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Th e last argument deals with already mentioned hierarchy of norms in public international law. Unfortunately, the source Italy refers to in its submission is only the minority opinion in Al-Adsani. Although the judgment of the ECHR Grand Chamber was decided only by the tightest possible majority (9:8), it is still this majority which prevailed. Minority opinion refers again to procedural eff ects of ius cogens in civil proceedings against states:
Th e acceptance therefore of the jus cogens nature of the prohibition of torture entails that a State allegedly violating it cannot invoke hierarchically lower rules (in this case, those on State immunity) to avoid the consequences of the illegality of its actions.
[…] Due to the interplay of the jus cogens rule on prohibition of torture and the rules on State immunity, the procedural bar of State immunity is automatically lift ed, because those rules, as they confl ict with a hierarchically higher rule, do not produce any legal eff ect.
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German argumentation, if inter-temporal aspect discussed above is omitted, is twofold. First one deals with lack of any relevant state practice. In fact, Italy builds its arguments mainly on the judicial practice of its own courts. Even the closest counterpart of Ferrini judgment, namely the Greek Distomo case, was fi nally overcome by later ruling by the Special Supreme Court. As far as the ECHR is concerned, all cases connected with mutual relationship between serious human rights violations and state immunity (Al-Adsani, McElhinney, Fogarty, Kalogeropoulous) were decided in favor of the latter. Finally, even Ferrini case, which lies in the center of whole dispute, uses very cautious language, since Corte di Cassazione merely ruled out "it could be presumed that a principle limiting the immunity of a State which has committed crimes against humanity was in the process of formation." 59 Th e court speaks about the process of formation of custom, not about already created customary rule. An exception to state immunity which would be applicable in situations of serious human rights violations is not part of any international instrument, in the opinion of present author it can enter fl oor of international normativity only through the formation of new customary rule. Potential pronouncement in a decision of the ICJ or any other international tribunal would be of only declaratory character, as courts cannot create law, they can only apply it. Formation of custom in international law is subject to widely shared conditions, among which uniformity, extensiveness and representativeness are usually mentioned. 60 It seems that practice, as far as immunity for human rights violation is concerned, is uniform, extensive and representative only in so far, as immunity is retained and preserved for states. Only one inter-state dispute which had been decided in favor of non-immunity was subsequently presented to the ICJ. Italian cases should be therefore "treated as breaches of [existing] rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule." 61 Despite sympathy for Italian submission, especially in the part speaking about analogy to the development in international criminal law, one cannot disregard fact that ius cogens and state immunity are shaped by will of the states, element of consent retains its importance in this area. In current state of international law states are evidently not ready to accept idea that they should sacrifi ce their immunity on the altar of omnipresent emphasis on human rights. Fortunately, all relevant practice and case-law in area favoring immunity do not exclude development in customary international law in the future.
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Ad abuntandiam, one more argument supportive of German position should be mentioned in this section. Until recently, claims brought by individuals relating to damages suff ered during armed confl icts were unsuccessful, as they were governed by the law of armed confl ict which provides no right to claim compensation on the part of individual.
63 Reference is usually made to Art 3 of the Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Art 91 of the Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Th ese provisions provide that belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said instruments shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces. Th e acceptance of Italian argumentation would mean that cited rules of international humanitarian law have self-executing character which is far from being settled. Such position should be fi rst accepted across the state practice and only aft er promulgated by international forum. It is preferable that situations of macro-injustices are compensated in macro terms as well, i.e. by lump-sum agreements. It means at the same time that cases of isolated violation of human rights should be governed diff erently. In the light of previous analysis it is clear that such idea has not yet been accepted by states.
Conclusion
It is oft en said that every paper should be reformulable into simple questionanswer scheme. Th e question was revealed in the very title of present article: is state immunity already non-applicable (eclipse) in situations of serious human rights violations? Th e answer is simple: no! More complex answer would be: not yet (twilight). Th is position takes into account development of international law, its shift towards individual, but at the same time refl ects the lack of relevant state practice in the area. It was argued that state immunity concerns rules which are of procedural character, with the consequence that assessment of these rules follows the law in force at the time when a court is seized. Th e doctrine of inter-temporal law is not applied here and therefore state immunity can be interpreted in the light of current international law. Second, it was argued that well established exception, which provides for non-immunity once death, injury or damage is at least partly done on the territory of the forum state, is rather not applicable in relation to the armed forces. Th is conclusion is supported by the ECHR case-law (McElhinney), domestic case-law (Margellos) and work of the ILC. At the same time, some hesitation was revealed as to the interpretation of the UN Convention Art 12 -while state practice tends to exclude armed forces from its scope, there are arguments (modes of interpretation) which are indicative of their inclusion. Lastly, it was submitted that current international law of state immunity has not yet absorbed exception enabling to claim damages before domestic courts for serious human rights violation committed by foreign states. Th e most persuasive argument points to the lack of relevant state practice in this area. It was argued that as far as compensation for damages suff ered during armed confl ict is concerned, international humanitarian law does not accept right of individual to present claims on his/her own.
At the same time sympathy for Italian initiative was presented. Even the ECHR admitted that customary international of state immunity can develop in the future. Uniqueness of German-Italian dispute should be taken into account. Immunity Case contains three aspects which are of some diffi culty and controversy -fi rst one deals with inter-temporal law (events occurred during WW 2), second one concerns territorial facet (damage was at least partly caused on the territory of the forum state), last one aims to the author of wrongful act (atrocities were committed by the armed forces). If one imagines situation of violation of human rights which is current, isolated and not committed by the armed forces, despite it takes place outside the territory of the forum state (Al-Adsani scenario), much of the convincingness contained in German arguments simply disappears. It should be exactly this path which can lead to overall acceptance among states not to claim immunities where serious human right violations are at stake. It remains to be seen how long this path will be.
